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Just when Venezuela’s internal crisis, along with pressure from abroad, seemed to spell the
inevitable fall of the government of President Nicolás Maduro, everything shifted radically in
a matter of days, allowing the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of
Venezuela, PSUV) to reassert its hold over the country.
The political astuteness of the PSUV’s leaders, infighting among the members of the Mesa de la
Unidad Democrática (Democratic Unity Roundtable, MUD) opposition coalition, and a threat of
military intervention issued by US President Donald Trump turned the chaotic situation on its head
and allowed “Chavismo” to re-establish control.
With Venezuela’s sovereignty now apparently at stake, Maduro even drew a show of solidarity from
the majority of Latin American countries, including from governments that oppose him ideologically
and had, just days earlier, berated his administration for holding constitutionally questionable
elections for an Asamblea Nacional Constituyente (National Constituent Assembly, ANC).
The Maduro government scheduled the elections for July 30. In a preemptive move, the MUD
organized and held its own unofficial election, a referendum, on July 16, inviting Venezuelans to side
with them on two subjects: their rejection of the government’s ANC initiative, and their interest in
possible political intervention by the armed forces, a call for military subversion that the MUD first
made in late May.
It’s impossible to know how many people really participated in each of the two votes, which took
place against a background of violent protests that, in the last four months, cost more than 120 lives
(NotiSur, July 7, 2017). In both cases, organizers said that more that 7 million turned out. Lawmaker
Freddy Guevara, one of the spokespeople for Voluntad Popular (Popular Will, VP), an extremeright party that wants to oust Maduro, said beforehand that after the elections, the opposition would
begin “a permanent protest that will end the dictatorship.” Instead, the opposite has happened: The
street demonstrations have stopped.
Earlier, the Maduro administration faced a barrage of criticism from abroad. More than 30
presidents refused to recognize the legality of the ANC, and the Mercado Común del Sur (Southern
Common Market, MERCOSUR)—a trade bloc that includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay—suspended Venezuela’s membership sine die.
The government responded by calling for regional gubernatorial elections to be held on Dec. 10.
The move caught analysts by surprise and presented the opposition with the difficult dilemma
of whether or not to participate in the process. That, in turn, prompted an internal debate that
accentuated divisions within the MUD and paralyzed it.
The 545 constituents chosen for the ANC on July 30 were sworn in Aug. 4. They declared themselves
to be above the existing powers, took over the legislative functions of Venezuela’s unicameral
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parliament, the Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly), and created a “truth, justice, and
reconciliation committee” to settle responsibility questions regarding the bloody events of the
past several months. The ANC’s primary job will be to rewrite the 1999 Constitution and issue
laws and decrees to “restructure the country’s political, economic, and institutional systems.” This
transcendental process will take place without any involvement from the opposition.
An article by the Inter Press Service news agency and published Aug. 11 in the Uruguayan magazine
Brecha offered a summary of the dizzying days in Venezuela. “There’s no rest in the country,”
the article reads. “On Aug. 6, there was an attack by dissident soldiers on a barracks, with deaths,
injuries, arrests, and stolen weapons; political prisoners who’d been sent to their homes and then
returned to jail went back to being under house arrest; a general was taken from a prison, and now
his whereabouts is unknown; the attorney general was ousted and replaced by an ombudsman; the
Supreme Court’s constitutional chamber removed, disqualified, and arrested opposition mayors for
failing to stop street protests in their municipalities; the top brass of the armed forces declared itself
to be anti-imperialist and reaffirmed its support for Maduro and the ANC process; the opposition,
despite declaring itself in disobedience, agreed to register candidates for the regional gubernatorial
elections on Dec. 10.”

Divisive dilemma
Until two months ago, the MUD had been insisting that regional elections be held. Now, its
most extreme wing thinks the opposition should forgo the elections and instead concentrate
on “permanent protest” in the streets with the aim of toppling the government “by any means
necessary,” a repeat of the violent strategy applied in April 2014 and known as “La Salida” (the way
out) (NotiSur, April 4, 2014).
Others in the opposition think the MUD ought to take part in the elections lest they lose even more
representation, as they did in 2005, when the right boycotted the legislative elections and left the
Asamblea Nacional, as a result, under the absolute control of the PSUV (NotiSur, Dec. 16, 2005).
With the language they’re employing, the two opposition factions seem more like enemies than
coalition partners.
“The only option we have is the electoral one,” said lawmaker Henry Ramos Allup, leader of Acción
Democrática (Democratic Action, AD), the country’s oldest political party. “Nobody took to the
streets to insist on the [high] abstention rate or challenge the [ANC] elections. And don’t keep trying
to use the deaths as an excuse, because the people who died weren’t even from your side, nor were
they disavowing the elections.”
Corina Machado, leader of Vente Venezuela (Come Venezuela, VV) and one of the major
proponents of “La Salida” fired back, saying, “To participate is to betray.” Machado, a former
lawmaker, announced VV’s withdrawal from the MUD and warned, in reference to Ramos Allup,
“They’re going to end up alone. The streets are empty of protests because Venezuelans feel
betrayed by you people, who by agreeing to participate in rigged elections are validating a criminal
dictatorship.”
Antonio Ledezma, a former mayor of Caracas and one of the country’s best-known prisoners,
agrees. “We can’t give up now,” he said. “It’d be impossible to get any more support from the
people than we’ve had, impossible to get any more support from the international community.
Participating [in the election] would be to betray them.”
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VP, Alianza Bravo Pueblo (Brave People Alliance) and another five of the 20 groups that make up the
MUD feel similarly and use the same insulting arguments put forth by Machado and Ledezma.
“With the ANC, they’ve already formed an alternate government. We can’t validate these
elections,” lawmaker Juan Requesens told journalist Vanessa Davies during an Aug. 6 broadcast
on the private radio station Unión Radio. “The important thing now is to bring the country to a
standstill. There’s a war coming, people! In order to trigger the intervention that will save us, we
need to take this step.”
Requesens is a member of Primero Justicia (Justice First, PJ), the party of MUD leader Henrique
Capriles. His surprising declaration isn’t representative of the PJ as a whole. And yet, neither
Capriles—a two-time presidential candidate (NotiSur, Oct. 19, 2012)—nor anyone else in the party
attempted to censor the lawmaker.

‘The military option’
Until that point, no leader had come out publicly in favor of outside intervention. Instead, there is
widespread agreement that any kind of armed intrusion into internal affairs—more specifically,
intervention by the US, which is what’s really being talked about here—would only serve to bring
the Venezuelan people and government closer together.
In a July 26 column in The New York Times, David Smilde, a senior fellow at the Washington Office
on Latin America (WOLA), suggested that a mediation effort be made by a group of four or six
friendly Latin American countries but warned, firmly, that the US “must stay at the margins.”
Smilde, a Venezuela expert and professor at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana, said the
Trump administration could help by facilitating “diplomacy around the negotiations” but insisted
that it “refrain from trying to lead and must resist adopting distracting unilateral actions.”
Another WOLA pundit, Program Director Geoff Thale, also questioned the wisdom of unilateral
action and said that US intervention would just give Maduro the pretext he needs to whip up
nationalist sentiment among the Venezuelan people. Latin American leaders who are friendly with
the US, such as Chile’s Michele Bachelet or Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, also came out strongly
against any kind of intervention.
The various reactions followed a series of confusing threats Trump made about US Treasury
Department sanctions against 22 top Venezuelan officials. The Treasury Department first slapped
sanctions on 14 officials, including Maduro himself. Then, on Aug. 9, eight more names were added
to the list, including Adán Chávez, older brother of former president Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), the
deceased leader of the Bolivarian Revolution. The measure implies the freezing of assets and bars
US citizens from negotiating with the Venezuelans in question.
Finally, on Aug. 11, Trump crossed the line from talking about individual Venezuelan officials to
threatening a military attack on the country as a whole (SourceMex, Aug. 16, 2017). “We have many
options for Venezuela,” he said. “And by the way, I’m not going to rule out a military option. We
have many options or Venezuela. This is our neighbor. We’re all over the world, and we have troops
all over the world in places that are very, very far away. Venezuela is not very far away, and the
people are suffering, and they’re dying.”
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Two days later, US Vice President Mike Pence kicked off a tour of Latin America that took him to
Colombia, Argentina, Chile, and Panama, where he delivered the message of Trump’s military
intentions directly.

-- End --
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